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ABSTRACT
This qualitative case study analyses the Chilean NGO TECHO, now present in 19 countries in Latin 
America  and the  Caribbean,  from the  perspective  of  Foucault's  concept  of  governmentality,  as 
elaborated by Rose and Miller (2008). They argue that non-state modes of power are the defining 
features  of  contemporary  societies,  and  that  these  operate  through  loose,  associative  networks 
through  which  actors  come  to  define  common  perceptions  of  problems  and  common  aims. 
Governmentality, it will be argued, operates with certain rationalities translated into programs that 
seek to shape the conduct of others. In accordance with the theoretical framework, the study focuses 
on  the  problematics,  practices  and programs of  slum erradication,  in  which  TECHO has  been 
participating as  a  constructor  of  emergency housing and as  an intermediate  entity  between the 
government and the inhabitants of slums, organizing them to apply for housing subsidies. My main 
research question is: How has the role of TECHO evolved in relation to the government programs 
to eradicate  campamentos in Chile? The subquestions are: What practices has this role involved, 
currently and historically? How do these practices enable “government at a distance”?
The  material  for  the  study  was  collected  during  a  2,5  month  volunteering  period  with 
TECHO in its office in Santiago, and includes 13 qualitative interviews with TECHO directors, 
government employees, housing committee members and other organizations with experience on 
housing policies, as well as field observation in a campamento in the Santiago Metropolitan Region 
and various news sources and government reports. The findings of the study situate TECHO in a 
complex network of relations, starting with the contruction of mediaguas, to becoming a supplier in 
the government's constantly failing slum erradication programs. They also show how the neoliberal 
forms of “government at a distance” and “government through community” involve not so much the 
shrinking  of  government  but  expanding  it  into  new  spheres,  as  is  the  case  with  the  “Social 
Inclusion”, a government methodology adopted by TECHO, which involves intervening into both 
group dynamics through community development  and the psycho-social  sphere of the group of 
individuals who have been defined as a problem. As a conclusion, I will argue that these forms of 
neoliberal governmentality have continuously failed to achieve their aims of erradicating the slums 
and maintaining social cohesion, as they only address the inevitable consequences of a  free-market 
model that perpetuates inequality.
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List of acronyms and terminology
EGIS Entidad Gestión Inmobiliaria Social (Social Housing Management Entity)
EaGIS Entidad Autogestión Inmobiliaria Social (Social Housing Self-Management Entity)
EP Entidad Patrocinante (Suporting Entity)
FPS Ficha de Protección Social (Social Protection Score)
FSV Fondo Solidario de Vivienda (Solidarity Housing Fund)
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
LAC Linea de Atención de Campamentos (Line of attention to Campamentos)
MINVU Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo (Ministry of Housing)
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
SERVIU Servicio de Vivienda y Urbanismo (Housing and Urban Development Service)
SIDA Swedish International Develoment Agency
UNDEF United Nations Democracy Fund 
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Allegados
Homeless people living with friends and relatives in conditions of overcrowding. The largest group 
of homeless people in Chile.
Aldea
Transitory  area  with  emergency  housing  constructed  after  natural  disasters.  Can  also  signify  a 
transitory area within a campamento in the process of erradication.
Campamento
According to a definition shared by TECHO and the Ministry of Housing, a campamento is defined 
as  “A predominantly urban settlement  with  more  than eight  families  inhabiting in  an  irregular  
manner  a  piece  of  land,  exhibiting  a  lack  of  at  least  one  basic  service  (electricity,  water  and 
sanitation system), and whose dwellings are grouped or built together.” (MINVU 2013)
Habilitación Social
A plan to  be  developed together  with  a  social  housing committee  and the EGIS;  a  mandatory 
requirement in the social housing programs. (MINVU 2008)
Mediagua
An emergency house of usually 18m2, intended for a family of 4, constructed with prefabricated 
wooden modules and a zinc roof on 15 stilts.
Toma de terreno
An organized land occupation.
Población/Pobladores
Working class neighborhoods/working class people.
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Charity without justice will not save us from social ills, but only creates a profound resentment.  
Injustice causes much greater evils than charity can repair.
Saint Alberto Hurtado
Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed  
with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.
Michel Foucault
1. Introduction
On the 28th of March 2013, thousands of students were protesting on the streets of Santiago and 
other  major  Chilean  cities  for  free  and  not-for-profit  education  and  the  reformation  of  the 
constitution1.  As has become almost ritual  since the student protests started in 2010, the march 
ended with a confrontation between “encapuchados”, masked protesters, and the special forces of 
the police. At the same time, in another part of the city, the communications team of the Chilean 
NGO TECHO was promoting its campaign “Revolution TECHO”2, using social media to promote 
stories of  “personal  revolutions”  of  the volunteers  and the  residents  of  campamentos,  irregular 
settlements.  The  organization,  founded  by  a  Jesuit  priest  in  Chile  in  1997,  works  with  the 
problematic of slums, irregular settlements which in Chile are called campamentos. It has received 
numerous prizes for its work from the UN Habitat, and has since 2005 been partnering with the 
Inter-American Development Bank3 with the mission of “overcoming” poverty and erradicating 
irregular settlements in Chile and 18 other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It states as 
its mission to “Work tirelessly to overcome extreme poverty in slums, through training and joint 
action  of  families  and  youth  volunteers.  Furthermore,  to  promote  community  development,  
denouncing the situation in which the most excluded communities live. And lastly, to advocate for 
social  policies  with  other  actors  in  society”4.  In  Chile,  it  is  also  acting as  an  Entidad  Gestión 
Inmobiliaria Social, enrolling the poor people of campamentos into government housing programs.
Chile is often referred to as a model of development for other countries in Latin America as 
it has experienced 30 years of sustained economic growth, and has managed to reduce poverty to 
under 15%. It's GDP per capita is more than USD 22 000 and it has been a member of OECD since 
20105. However, economic growth has not benefited all Chileans: a recent study by Birdsall et. al 
1http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-21971511  
2 www.revolutiontecho.org
3 http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2005-09-21/idb-and-un-techo-para-chile-foundation-sign-35-million-to-
transfer-successful-methodology-for-integrating-low-income-groups-into-the-productive-system,852.html
4 http://www.techo.org/en/techo/mision-vision-valores/
5 http://www.oecd.org/chile/chilesaccessiontotheoecd.htm
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(2013: 25) defined 41% of Chileans as “strugglers”, living on $4-10 a day and risking to join the 
ranks of the poor. In 2011, there were 657 campamentos in all of Chile with 83 000 people living in 
them  (MINVU  2013).  Several  government  programs  have  attempted  to  eradicate  them  by 
transferring  their  inhabitants  to  social  housing,  but  they  have  so  far  been unable  to  solve  the 
problem; in fact between 2007 and 2011 the number of people living in them increased by 7000 
(MINVU 2013). The “Integrated Plan” for  campamentos of the current government proposes an 
alliance with civil society and explicitly mentions TECHO as a partner in the process (MINVU 
2011).
NGOs and social movements are commonly seen as forming a part of an “autonomous civil 
society”, which by some is the answer to the problems of democracy, providing a counterweight to 
the power of an autonomous and all-powerful state (see Foley and Edwards 1997). Though the civil 
society discourse has become influential  development thinking since the 90s,  civil  society as a 
concept is poorly defined (Edwards 2008: 2-3). There is no agreement between who is in and who is 
out: NGOs, for example, are seen as alternatively an important part of civil society (see Banks and 
Hulme 2012) or handmaidens of neoliberalism (Petras and Veltmeyer 2011). In Chile, NGOs such 
as TECHO have joined forces with the government in programs aimed at “erradicating poverty”. In 
contrast, the student movement, workers, indigenous people and regional movements demand social 
justice and redistribution in large scale protests. What is the sense, then, in grouping organizations 
with radically different strategies and aims under the umbrella of civil society?
The academic community has increasingly come to question the categorical separation of 
state and civil society (Frödín 2010, Tvedt 2006a, Miller and Rose 2008). Drawing on Foucault's 
concept of governmentality, Miller and Rose (2008) have argued that state is just one of the forms 
taken  by  government.  Power,  from this  point  of  view,  is  excersized  through  “technologies  of 
government”, diffused in various, and increasingly non-state institutions, producing knowledge and 
elaborating  programs  that  enable  populations  to  be  “governed  at  a  distance”.  This  study 
concentrates  not  on  categories  such  as  “state”  or  “civil  society”,  but  the  actual  practices  of 
governing, which are increasingly undertaken by non-state actors such as TECHO. 
1.1 Aim of the study and research question
The aim of this qualitative case study is to analyze the role of the NGO TECHO in the government 
programs to eradicate campamentos. This will involve a historical analyses of how the organization 
came into being, what it has done, what it is doing now, and the ways in which it forms a part of  
governmentality. Such an analysis will inevitably also include an account of housing policy as a 
4
technology  for  governing  the  campamentos.  According  to  Miller  and  Rose  (2008:  22)  “the 
analytical language structured by the philosophical opposition of state and civil society is unable to 
comprehend contemporary transformations in modes of exercise of political power”. Instead of such  
“grand schemata”, studies of government should depart from “the apparently humble and mundane 
mechanisms which make it possible to govern” (ibid: 32). 
My main  research question  is:  How has  the  role  of  TECHO evolved in  relation  to  the 
government programs to eradicate  campamentos in Chile? The sub-questions are: What practices 
has this role involved, currently and historically? How do these practices enable “government at a 
distance”? By answering these questions, I wish to convey the story of an organization, involved in 
a policy, sustained by a model whose effectiveness in delivering collective goods is increasingly 
becoming questioned in the context of intensifying social mobilization.
1.2 Previous studies
As Tvedt (2006a) has pointed out, much of the current NGO research tradition has chosen to ignore 
the ways in which NGOs are connected to states. Instead, this tradition has assumed NGOs to be a 
part of civil society and has mainly been concerned with how to improve the work of NGOs or with 
evaluating their projects and programs.
There are few independent studies of TECHO, although the organization has existed since 
1997 and expanded to most countries in Latin America. This may be because TECHO has its own 
research center (Centro Investigación Social,  CIS), where interns interested in contributing may 
produce research for the purposes of the organization. Atría (2007), director of CIS at the time6, 
discusses TECHO's work in Chile under the title “Social capital and volunteering: the keys for 
solidarity  financing  for  social  housing.  The  Un  Techo  para  Chile  Foundation  case  [sic]”.  He 
describes TECHO's work model in the campamentos at the time when it was getting involved in the 
housing  policy  as  an  Entidad Gestion  Inmobiliaria  Social  (EGIS,  Social  Housing Management 
Entity), and emphasizing the role of volunteers in the process as creating a commitment with the 
poor families. However, he fails to mention that “Habilitación Social” (Social Inclusion), a process 
of “community empowerment” which is  currently the focus of TECHO's work,  is  a mandatory 
requirement in accessing the government housing subsidies, for which the Ministry of Housing has 
produced a detailed manual (see MINVU 2008). 
Other studies affiliated with, but not directly produced by TECHO include Wazkun's (2007) 
evaluation of TECHO's microcredit program, and a UNDEF evaluation report of TECHO's project 
6 http://revistainvi.uchile.cl/index.php/INVI/article/view/274/931
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in El Salvador, Argentina and Peru (Aguilar and Ferreira 2012). Wazkun found that the beneficiaries  
of TECHO's microcredit program increased their income twice as much as the control group. The 
UNDEF  evaluation,  though  carried  out  in  Argentina  only,  stated  that  the  project  had  brought 
important benefits for the people participating in it, but criticized the organization for the lack of 
focus on rights.
There are numerous critical studies on the Chilean housing policy (Gilbert 2002, Rodriguez 
and Sugranyes 2012a, 2012b, Posner 2012, Özler 2012). Gilbert (2002), traces its history to the 
Pinochet  Dictatorship,  a  University  of  Chile  study  financed  by  USAID  in  1976,  under  the 
consultation of a group of Chicago-trained economists commonly referred to as the Chicago boys, 
and the Chilean Chamber of Construction. Special credit for the model is given to Miguel Kast, a 
Chicago-trained economist who at the time was a subdirector of the Chilean planning ministry (ibid:  
313).  With loans from the IDB and World Bank, the new housing model did away with state-
provided public housing and replaced it with a competitive system for stimulating demand for social  
housing. This was to be achieved by a one time direct cash subsidy targeted at the poorest segments 
for buying a property constructed by the private market. Though the Washington institutions were 
initially not enthusiastic about the model, they began strongly promoting it as a best practice in the 
1990s, after the democratic Concertación governments had consolidated the model (ibid: 319-320). 
Posner (2012) applies Esping-Andersen's welfare regime typology on the Chilean housing 
policy, and demonstrates how housing was transformed from a right during the 1970-1973 Unidad 
Popular government to a commodity to be achieved by individual effort under the dictatorship.  In 
this system, eligibility for a housing subsidy is determined by a means test (Ficha CAS, now called 
the Ficha de protección Social, FPS), and it has a savings requirement which favors the less poor  
who have more capacity  to  save.  The poor  are supposed to  form a committee  and elaborate  a 
housing project,  then compete against other committees for access to the funds of FSV (Fondo 
Solidario de Vivienda). He argues that despite the stated aims of the housing policy to promote 
participation and cooperation, its competitive structure creates disincentives for collective action 
among the  poor,  undermining class  solidarity.  Posner's  interview material  is  from 2006,  before 
TECHO got involved in policy implementation, so he does not discuss NGO participation in the 
policies. Özler's (2011) analysis of Concertación housing programs, arrived in similar conclusions. 
Though improvements were made in successive programs (Chile Barrio under Lagos and Linea de 
Atención de Campamentos under Bachelet), and the poorest are now able to access housing without 
credit, with a minimum 10UF ($400) savings. However, the programs continued to be plagued by a 
limited scope of popular participation, segregated neighborhoods far off from the central areas of 
the city. Özler also mentions the role of NGOs as EGIS, intermediate organizations between the 
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government  and  the  poor,  their  main  role  being  “helping  to  manage  discontent  generated  by 
government policies during the long and uncertain wait for housing that these poor citizens faced” 
(ibid: 10). She does not, however, delve deeper into the significance of the role of NGOs in the 
campamentos.
While the Chilean housing policy has been advertised as a model, and adopted by a number 
of countries, including South Africa and Colombia (Gilbert 2002: 310), its problems have become 
apparent.  Rodriguez and Sugranyes  (2012a,  2012b) call  it  “The emperor's  new clothes”:  while 
housing has been constructed on a massive scale, the government now faces the problem, not of 
“those without a roof” but “those with a roof”. The scope of this study does not allow an in-depth 
discussion of the problems of social housing in Chile, but a study conducted these social housing 
blocks in Santiago, 64% of the inhabitants would prefer to leave their apartments because of the low 
quality of housing, insecurity and peripheral location (Rodriguez and Sugranyes 2012a: 63). The 
housing  is  not  adaptable  to  the  requirements  of  the  families,  leading to  dangerous  and  illegal 
amplifications, and it is no investment for the poor as its value does not rise over time (ibid: 58-60).  
Since 2006, the government has started demolishing some of the worst examples of the policies of 
previous decades (Rodriguez and Sugranyes 2012b: 100), such as the notorious blocks of Bajos de 
Mena in Puente Alto, Metropolitan Region7. 
This study differs from the previous studies in that,  instead of evaluating the impact  of 
TECHO, or the effectiveness of specific government policies, its focus is on NGOs as actors within 
government programs of eradicating campamentos, with TECHO as the case. 
1.3 Structure of the paper
This paper is  structured as follows:  Chapter  2 will  focus on methodological  questions, such as 
selection of  the  case  and interview subjects.  Chapter  3  will  present  the  theoretical  framework,  
defining  governmentality  and  the  concepts  of  “Government  at  a  distance”  and  “Government 
through community”. It also discusses NGOs and governmentality. Chapter 4 analyses the practices 
of TECHO in relation to different governmental rationalities influencing slum eradication programs.  
It departs from the construction of mediaguas (emergency housing), then goes on to describe how 
the organization came to be involved in the government's slum eradication programs, in which 
“Habilitación Social”  (Social  Inclusion) forms an important  part.  Finally,  it  presents a  tentative 
analyses  of  the  relations  of  TECHO  with  other  actors.  Chapter  5  presents  a  synthesis  and 
conclusions.
7 http://www.puentealtoaldia.cl/cronica/demolicion-en-bajos-de-mena
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2. Method
This study approaches the case of TECHO from the qualitative research tradition, applying a case 
study design. The material of the study was conducted during nearly three months of volunteering 
in TECHO's headquarters in Santiago. I worked as a volunteer translator at  the communication 
department of TECHO headquarters, translating press releases and internal documents from Spanish 
into  English.  This  immersion  in  the  research  setting  enabled  me  to  become  familiar  with  the 
organization and its work, as well as to identify interview subjects and potential  themes for the  
interviews. I carried out 13 semi-structured interviews, 5 with TECHO (the CEO and 4 Directors of 
different areas), and 8 outside the organization (authorities, activists, housing committee members 
and a researcher). On two occasions in April – May 2013, I also had a chance for field observation 
in a campamento in the Metropolitan Region.
Qualitative research often involves an iterative process of data collection and specification 
of research questions (Bryman 2012: 384). I started out my research with the broad area of NGO – 
state relations in Chile. The primary reason for why I selected TECHO as a case, was that it is one 
of the largest and most visible NGOs in Chile, and because it has expanded rapidly to other Latin 
American countries, therefore having broader regional relevance. After having gathered a part of 
my interview material, and closely followed TECHO's external discourse as a translator, I became 
more interested in the deeper significance of the practices and programs they were participating in, 
concentrating on its role in governmentality.
2.1 Ethical considerations
In an initial meeting with my TECHO contacts, I presented a study information sheet, introducing 
the university and my general research area, state-civil society relations in Chile. I also made it clear  
that any internal material that came into my hands during my volunteering would not be used for 
the study. NGOs incomes to a large extent depend on their public image (Tvedt 2006a), and as 
TECHO has  recently  re-branded  itself  for  a  future  global  expansion8,  I  assured  the  interview 
subjects that they would remain anonymous. This is because I did not wish to make them uneasy 
about voicing their opinions or to cause harm to their future employment prospects. As the number 
of interviews I  was able  to  conduct  is  limited,  and I  do not  wish my interview subjects  to be 
identified, the interviews will only be ascribed to the general title of the person.
8 http://www.techo.org/paises/chile/por-que-somos-techo/
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2.2 Selection of interview subjects
The Santiago office of TECHO, located in an old Jesuit construction school in the municipality of 
San Joaquin in Santiago, is divided into TECHO-Chile, and TECHO Headquarters. The two used to 
be separate organizations, with TECHO Headquarters for managing Latin American countries other 
than Chile. However, in 2012, a reorganization and rebranding took place which turned TECHO 
Chile into one more country under the Headquarters. I interviewed the CEO of the organization, as 
well as Directors in different departments, such as Housing, Work and Education, and “Habilitación 
Social”.
I  soon realized I  would not  be able  to  get  very far  with my research area interviewing 
TECHO alone, and found an NGO activist and a sociologist from Universidad de Chile to provide 
me with a broader perspective of the context in Chile. About 6 weeks into my volunteering, I was  
offered a chance to accompany teams of secondary school students to build mediaguas (emergency 
housing)  in  a  campamento  in  the  Metropolitan  Region.  This  resulted  in  a  snowball  sample  as 
through TECHO, I received a contact to the Servicio de Vivienda y Urbanismo (SERVIU), which is 
an executive arm of the Ministry of Housing. The interview with her resulted in another visit to the 
campamento,  this time to observe a ceremony during which a private  foundation was donating 
mattresses and bedclothes to families with children. I had a chance to interview two members of  
housing committees, one run by TECHO, the other recently established by SERVIU. I also received 
two other contacts;  a  person working with social  organizations at  the municipality,  and a  high 
official  at  the  Secretaria  Ejecutiva  de  Aldeas  y  Campamentos,  under  the  Ministry  of  Housing 
(MINVU).  These  interviews provided me with an opportunity to  triangulate  the  views and the 
practices  of  the  organization  with  government  officials  working  with  the  problematic  of 
campamentos. In my interview with the municipal director, she mentioned a social movement of 
indebted social housing inhabitants. After some searching, I found contacts to a poblador movement 
in another municipality in Santiago, and interviewed them, thus being able to incorporate the view 
of those who have had first-hand experience with the housing policies.
2.3 Interview method
All the interviews were open-ended, and lasted from 30 minutes to more than an hour. Most often I 
presented a topic, and let the interview subjects talk, trying to interrupt them as little as possible.  
With TECHO, the topics were related to the person's work area, though with the CEO of TECHO,  
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the emphasis was on the history, achievements and future challenges of the organization. Interviews 
to the housing committee members concerned their experiences with living in the campamento and 
their work of the committees. With the exception of one interview subject, who had gone to an 
English school and was thus fluent and comfortable with speaking English, all the interviews were 
conducted in Spanish.
2.4 Analysis of interview and secondary material
The transcribed interviews resulted in more than 90 pages of material.  In addition, I have used 
various studies,  plans and presentations provided by MINVU and SERVIU, as well  as material 
publicly available on TECHO's website. The content analysis of the material focuses on practices of 
TECHO in the campamentos and the understandings of the interview subjects of the problematic of 
campamentos and housing policy.  Three  main practices of  TECHO in Chile  emerged from the 
analysis: The construction of emergency housing (mediaguas), its participation in slum eradication 
programs as an EGIS, and programs of Habilitación Social (Social inclusion). 
2.5 Limitations
Generalizability is often considered a problem in a case study approach (Punch 2005: 145, Bryman 
2012: 69, 71).  However, as Flyvbjerg (2001: 71) has pointed out, case studies are invaluable for 
human learning:
First, the case study produces precisely the type of context-dependent knowledge which makes it  
possible to move from the lower to the higher levels in the learning process; second, in the study of 
human affairs, there exists only context-dependent knowledge, which thus presently rules out the 
possibility of epistemic theoretical construction.
He argues that cases are of especial value in social sciences (ibid: 72), and no more problematic 
than other approaches in terms of generalization and validity. But for Flyvbjerg, context-specifity is 
key to producing relevant knowledge about social phenomena, and therefore social scientists should 
not try to imitate the hypothetico-deductive natural science models or not even seek to generalize 
(ibid: 75-77). For my study, TECHO represents a kind of a special case that is important in its own 
right  and  my  intention  is  not  so  much  to  generalize  all  the  NGOs  in  Chile  than  to  produce 
knowledge about this particular case. 
On a practical level, the study was limited by access to people in the office environment, and 
the fact that I was volunteering with TECHO Central Office, not the Chile Office, which, though 
10
located in the premises, is organizationally separate. As to my position as a researcher, I was an 
outsider to the organization, and my research area was not chosen by the organization. I therefore 
felt I had to work hard to “earn” access to people. Some of my interview requests were also ignored. 
One limitation is that my study does not incorporate the volunteers' perspective on TECHO's work, 
but  I  do not  consider  this  a  great  deficit  since  my aim is  not  to  evaluate  individual  efforts  in 
individual projects.
3. Theoretical framework – NGOs and governmentality
3.1 Defining governmentality
I  will  examine  TECHO  as  part  of  “governmentality”.  Governmentality,  according  to  Foucault 
(1979:  20,  quoted  in  Miller  and  Rose  2008:  27)  is  an  “ensemble  formed  by  the  institutions,  
procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very 
specific albeit complex form of power”. In this view, power, rather than imposed upon populations 
by an autonomous and unified state, is diffuse and exercised through multiple locations (Flyvbjerg 
2005). Elaborating on the concept of governmentality, Miller and Rose (2008) define it as “political 
rationalities”, normative ideals, and knowledge about the object of government, and the ways of 
expressing these in language. In the case of Chile, ending with the campamentos has been one such 
rationality. 
Government  is  inherently  programmatic  in  nature  (Miller  and Rose  2008:  29).  Political 
rationalities are “translated” into programs that address domains for governing that are perceived as 
problems.  In  Chile,  the  problem  of  campamentos  has  been  addressed  by  various  government 
programs seeking to enroll their inhabitants into social housing programs (see Özler 2012, Posner 
2012).  Programs  of  government  are  operationalized  through  “technologies  of  government” 
involving expertise and knowledge production in the form of quantifications, statistics, maps, and 
definitions that make certain areas or populations legitimate objects for intervention (Miller and 
Rose 2008: 32). The Ministry of Housing has produced surveys of campamentos in 1985, 1996, 
2006 and 2011 (MINVU 2013). The latest survey, “The Social Map of Campamentos” provides 
very  detailed  information  by  region,  satellite  maps,  and  characterizations  of  socioeconomic 
conditions,  such  as  family  structure,  savings  and employment  status,  and  physical  risks  in  the 
campamentos  (MINVU 2013).  The  rationale  has  been to  achieve  a  reliable  “measurement”  on 
which  to  base  the  optimal  allocation  of  housing  subsidies  to  residents  of  campamentos,  and 
information for the “Integrated Plan 2012-2013” for the campamentos. Such information is crucial 
to the practice of governing as it enables “intellectual mastery” over the domain to be governed 
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(ibid: 34). Programs, however, are bound to fail, or create new problematics, to be addressed by 
new programs (Miller and Rose 2008, see also Özler's evaluation of housing policies).
The language of expertise is key to forms of governmentality, as it allows to construct shared 
understandings between formally independent  actors.  A process of “translation”  allows political 
rationalities to be elaborated into programs and to construct shared understandings between actors, 
in 
which one actor or force is able to require or count upon a particular way of thinking and acting from 
another, hence assembling them together into a network not because of legal or institutional ties or 
dependencies, but because they have come to construe their problems in allied ways and their fate as  
in some way bound up with one another.  (Miller and Rose 2008: 34)
I witnessed the importance of the right language in a very concrete way in my translation work: it 
was  important  that  some  expressions  were  translated  in  a  certain  way  in  TECHO's  external 
communications.  For  example  “superación  de  pobreza”  was  to  be  rendered  in  English  as 
“overcoming poverty”, not “ending with poverty”, thus construing poverty as both an individual 
condition to be vanquished with persistency and a common challenge. TECHO is not the only one 
employing such terminology, the “Fundación para la Superacion de la Pobreza” was founded by the 
President already in 1994.9 Shortly after the return to democracy, the government had an imperative 
to depoliticize the Chilean society, and issues of redistribution and social justice were presented in 
terms of poverty, understood as a technical problem with a technical solution (Silva 1999).
Shared  understandings  constructed  through language enable  loosely assembled networks 
between constitutionally distinct actors, allowing “government at a distance”,
It is, in part, through adopting shared vocabularies, theories and explanations that loose and flexible  
associations  may  be  established  between  agents  across  time and space  -  Departments  of  State, 
pressure groups ,  academics, managers,  teachers,  employees, parents - whilst  each remains,  to a  
greater or lesser extent,  constitutionally distinct and formally independent. Each of these diverse 
forces can be enrolled in a governmental network to the extent that it can translate the objectives and  
values of others into its own terms, to the extent that the arguments of another become consonant 
with and provide norms for its own ambitions and actions. (Miller and Rose 2008: 35)
These  indirect,  network  forms  of  rule  are  becoming  increasingly  important  in  contemporary 
societies (Miller and Rose 2008: 64-65). In Chile, such “network forms of coordination”, including 
participatory governance, state – civil society alliances, and public – private partnerships have been 
employed to create “new forms of citizenship” (Leiva 2008: 157).
3.2 Neoliberal governmentality: communities and citizens
Neoliberal governmentality has reshaped political rationalities in distinct ways that have sought to 
9 http://www.fundacionpobreza.cl/webfsp.php?id=33
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realign  the  relations  between  the  individual  and  society  (Miller  and  Rose  2008:  80-81).  From 
governing  “from  the  social  point  of  view”  there  has  been  a  shift  to  “government  through 
community”. The change has taken place in three key dimensions: the spatial, the ethical and the 
domain of identity. Whereas the “social” modes of government were concerned with a territorially 
unified space of a nation, to which citizens where bound by solidarity created by social insurance,  
the “community” is increasingly becoming the unit of analysis and intervention. These diverse and 
heterogenous  communities  can  be  “micro-locales”  or  “moral”  or  “virtual”  communities.  The 
second, ethical dimension entails the movement from social citizenship with collective rights and 
responsibilities to “the individualized and autonomized actor, each of whom has unique, localized 
and specific ties to their particular family and to a particular moral community” (ibid: 92). The third 
dimension  of  identification  assumes  that  people  identify  with  and  show  allegiance  to  these 
communities that are assumed to pre-exist  but that nevertheless require the expertise of various 
specialists to manage them.
'Government through community' involves a variety of strategies for inventing and instrumentalizing 
these dimensions of allegiance between individuals and communities in the service of projects of 
regulation, reform or mobilization. (Miller and Rose 2008: 92)
Yet the rise of the community forms of governing does not imply a reduced role  for the state, 
merely  a  change  in  focus.  To  qualify  as  citizens,  individuals  are  now  expected  to  manage 
themselves in a way that reduces risk, by means of private insurance, consumer choices leading to  
health and prestige and that qualify them as responsible members of communities. Those that do not 
want or are not able to do this, are marginalized in what Miller and Rose (2008: 99) call “anti-
communities.” These are perceived as a risk, and in turn, become targets of further analysis and 
expert intervention (ibid: 104-105). One of the most unequal cities in the world (OECD 2013: 57),  
Santiago is a living example of the division between the “affiliated” and the “marginalized”: the 
rich  live  in  gated  communities  in  the  Eastern  suburbs,  the  rest  in  the  Southern  and  Western 
municipalities, in “poblaciónes” or social housing turned to ghettos (for income and poverty rates 
by municipality in the Metropolitan Region, see e.g. Agostini 2010: 241-242). 
As Cruikshank (2002) has argued, the perceived “powerlessness” and marginality of the 
poor have inspired efforts to empower them, to construct them as citizens through what she calls 
“technologies of citizenship”.  Yet such a “will to empower” others is a power relationship in itself.
3.3 NGOs and governmentality
The role  of NGOs has been on the rise globally.  As Tvedt (2006a:  678-679) argues,  the NGO 
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research tradition has been “ahistorical and non-contextual”, and rife with normative assumptions of  
NGOs as representatives of “global civil society”, and counterposing them to the state as being 
closer to the beneficiaries or more cost-effective in delivering services. This tradition has served to 
legitimate  the  image  of  NGOs as  “autonomous from the  state”,  and covered up what  often is 
financial dependence of the state. Similarly, it has assumed NGOs to adhere to a set of universal 
secular-humanist values, and ignored the role of religious NGOs in the international aid system 
(Tvedt  2006b).
According  to  the  Comparative  Non-Profit  sector  study  of  Johns  Hopkins  University 
(Irrarazaval  et  al.  2006),  state  funds  constituted  46%  of  the  funding  for  Chilean  non-profit 
organizations, a lions share going to service-oriented organizations, while what the study termed 
expressive  organizations  (such  as  human  rights  advocacy  or  cultural  organizations)  received 
insufficient funding. A brief look at the funds awarded to “civil society” organizations thorough the 
“Más por Chile”10 fund set up by president Sebastian Piñera, reveals that most organizations getting 
funds are going to large NGOs, often with religious roots, such as TECHO, Maria Ayuda, Hogar de 
Christo, and TECHO. This is partly explained by Chile's history: the Catholic Church had always 
played a strong role in charity, and during the dictatorship it assumed a role as a defender of the  
popular sectors (Irrarazaval et. al 2006: 43-47). 
It would be too much of a simplification to argue a direct relationship with state funds and 
state  agendas. Though the government compensates TECHO for services discussed later in this 
study,  most  of  its  budget  comes  from  companies  and  private  donations11.  In  their  work  on 
governmentality and NGOs, Sending and Neumann (2006) suggest that the relationship between the 
state and non-state actors cannot be seen as either a simple cooptation of NGOs by the state or as a  
zero-sum game in which the rise of non-state actors reduces state power. They  state that
the  self-association  and  political  will-formation  characteristic  of  civil  society  and  non-state
actors  do  not  stand  in  opposition  to  the  political  power  of  the  state,  but  is  a  most
central feature of how power operates in late modern society. (Sending and Neumann 2006: 652)
In  parallel  with  Miller  and  Rose's  (2008)  argument  that  freedom can  be  an  effective  way  of 
governing  individuals,  Sending  and  Neumann  (2006:  658)  argue  that  the  autonomy  and 
independence of civil society is key to government, that civil society is both the object and the 
subject of governance. Governmentality, thus, does not mean that the state controls NGOs, but that 
there is a mutual relationship in which the state has been able to draw on the NGOs expertise, of  
“what's  out  in  the  field”,  and  their  legitimacy  as  autonomous  actors  (ibid:  665).  Government 
10 http://masporchile.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/donaciones-recibidas/
11 http://www.techo.org/paises/chile/transparencia/informe-de-transparencia/
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becomes possible through entering in relationships with non-state actors that are in accordance with 
governmental rationalities (ibid: 667).
4. Analysis
4.1 What is in a mediagua?
TECHO  is  widely  known  in  Chile  as  a  constructor  of  mediaguas,  rudimentary,  prefabricated 
emergency houses of about 18m2, which the organization has been constructing on a massive scale 
since its beginning. I was told in the beginning that TECHO no longer constructs  mediaguas in 
Chile,  although  I  later  found  they  still  do  in  exceptional  circumstances.  As  the  construction 
continues  both  in  Chile  and  in  other  Latin  American  countries,  the  rationalities  behind  these 
dwellings merit closer inspection.
TECHO was born in 1997, when the Jesuit priest Felipe Berrios, together with a group of 
students from Universidad Católica went on a mission to Curanilahue in the region of Bio Bio in the  
South of Chile (Interview, CEO of TECHO 2013). They constructed a chapel in the shape of a 
mediagua.  These type of dwellings had been provided as emergency houses in  Chile since the 
earthquake of Chillán in 193912, and as a shelter to the poorest since the 1950's by the housing 
foundation of another large Chilean NGO, Hogar de Christo, founded by the canonized Alberto 
Hurtado.13
The students and the priest went on to build 350 mediaguas in the South, and, impacted by 
the experience of working with “those that were living in conditions of promiscuous overcrowding” 
(Berrios 2006: 28, my translation), came up with a project by the name of “2000 mediaguas for the 
year 2000”, together with Hogar de Christo and Infocap, the Jesuit occupational school in which 
TECHO's  Headquarters  is  now located.  The  project  was  a  success  and  constructed  over  5000 
mediaguas. The organization started taking form as
to the society, it made sense, to the youth it made sense, and a lot of young people from different  
universities and different places joined the constructions. The private sector was fascinated to see 
how they could help private social initiatives of high impact, and in some way it also made sense to  
the authorities, and this is how TECHO was formed. (Interview, CEO of TECHO 2013)
As Tvedt (2006b) points out, NGO research has tended to be silent on the role of religious NGOs 
and presumed all NGOs under a secular humanist umbrella.  However, like many development 
NGOs, TECHO's roots and value base are religious. Although TECHO pronounces itself as a non-
12 http://www.275dias.cl/2010/03/23/arquitecto-devela-origen-de-las-mediaguas-y-pide-una-mejor-fabricacion/
13 http://fundacionvivienda.cl/quienes-somos/historia/reseña-historica
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denominational organization, they state that the Jesuits 
“keep  supporting  this  project  through  the  figure  of  the  Chaplain,  who  is  the  president  of  the 
directory, protecting the fundamental values of this project, such as diversity, its non-confessional 
character,  the leadership of youth,  and its  fundamental  focus on working for the most  excluded 
families”.14 (my translation)
In Chile, this is nothing out of the ordinary, as the Catholic Church has a long tradition of charity 
dating back to the colonial period, and as it provided the only safe channel for NGOs during the  
first years of the military dictatorship (see Irrarazaval et al. 2006: 43-47). Felipe Berrios, who led 
TECHO from 1997 until leaving on a mission to Burundi in 2010, has been a public figure and a 
strong critic of the Chilean society (see Berrios 2006), but the Jesuits have since 2012 lowered their  
profile in TECHO and many of their other associated institutions, such as the Unversidad Alberto 
Hurtado, and Hogar de Christo (Sanhuaza and Lopéz 2012). 
 TECHO was formally registered in 2001 under the name of “Un Techo para Chile” (A roof 
for  Chile).  The  expansion  to  other  countries  in  Latin  America  started  the  same  year  with  El  
Salvador, where the organization was known as “Un Techo para mí país” (A roof for my country).  
This international growth has been spontaneous, initiated by students that have come to Chile to 
study and have wanted to replicate the organization back home. After receiving initial support from 
the  headquarters,  the  country  organizations  operate  with  their  own  resources  (Interview,  CEO 
TECHO 2013). The joint construction of  mediaguas by volunteers and residents is supposed to 
create  a  kind  of  link  which  would  allow entry  into  the  campamento,  and  a  starting  point  for 
TECHO's intervention15.
In  2008,  TECHO  officially  stopped  building  mediaguas  in  Chile,  after  they  had  been 
criticized by the authorities for enlarging the campamentos. This dynamic has to be understood in 
context: the largest group of homeless in Chile do not live in the campamentos but as  allegados, 
with friends or relatives in conditions of overcrowding (Özler 2012: 3). However, the government 
programs give priority in the housing subsidy queue to the people in the campamentos, as they are 
considered  more  “vulnerable”  (Interview,  MINVU 2013).  This,  according  to  the  authorities  of 
SERVIU and MINVU, gave incentives for some to go live in them in the hope that they could jump 
the housing subsidy queue. 
while the municipality was trying to stop the campamentos from growing, many people went to  
TECHO or Hogar de Cristo to buy a mediagua or to ask for help so they would be given a mediagua. 
There  was  an  uncontrolled  handing  out  of  mediaguas.  So  the  campamentos  kept  growing. 
Unfortunately there is a contradiction with TECHO and the mediaguas, or could be that the opinions 
of the authorities are contradictory, because on the other hand they blame TECHO for enlarging the 
campamentos, but on the other hand when there is an earthquake or a fire and you have to make a  
transitory area [with mediaguas], who are the first to arrive, and the fastest with volunteers? TECHO 
(Interview, SERVIU, 2013)
14 http://www.techo.org/techo/preguntas-frecuentes/
15 http://www.techo.org/techo/modelo-de-trabajo-techo/
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Instead  of  mediaguas,  TECHO now concentrated  on  projects  of  social  housing,  launching  the 
campaign “2010 without campamentos”. The target was not achieved, and a devastating earthquake 
hit Chile in 2010. TECHO returned to constructing mediaguas, and to date they have constructed 
over 60.000 of them in Chile (Interview, CEO TECHO 2013). They continue to be constructed by 
volunteers: for this year's voluntary work (there are two large-scale mobilizations of volunteers a 
year,  one  in  the  summer and one in  the  winter)  in  the North and South of  Chile,  high-school  
students were constructing “Viviendas Progresivas”, an improved, larger version of the  mediagua 
with actual rooms and a kitchen16. Chilean University students are generally traveling abroad to 
construct; this year 1200 University students went to Paraguay to construct mediaguas.17
A recent study of the TECHO mediaguas by J-PAL (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab; 
Cooper et. al 2013) in Mexico, Uruguay and El Salvador found that these basic houses improved the 
living satisfaction and self-esteem of their  inhabitants.  However, the study found no significant 
effects on health, household asset ownership or income of the families. They provide a sturdier roof,  
and a wooden floor instead of a dirt floor. What, then is the significance of the  mediagua? One 
answer is provided by Joss Van Der Rest, founder of Hogar de Christo's housing foundation, which, 
according to the CEO, TECHO is considering acquiring:
It is not so much the quality of the house that matters but avoiding the promiscuity that kills human 
values. It is true that the rooms that we built have no sophistication whatsoever, but they help a  
young couple to maintain their marriage, to argue in private and to make up in bed without problems 
because  nobody else  witnessed  the  argument  and the  mother-in-law was  not  intervening.18 (My 
translation)
From the  Church's  viewpoint  then,  living  in  a  campamento,  or  as  allegados,  presents  a  moral  
hazard, and the mediagua serves as a guarantor of family values and marital happiness.
From  the  authorities  point  of  view,  the  mediaguas  serve  other  functions:  in  Chile  the 
beneficiaries of social housing projects typically have to wait for on average three years for the 
construction of their proper houses (Interview, TECHO Director 2013). The persons need a slightly 
more habitable place to stay during the long wait.  In the campamento where I took part  in the 
construction with TECHO volunteers, they also had another function: people from the margins of 
the campamento were to be moved to a transitory area (aldea) within the campamento, which would 
allow the authorities to reduce the size of the campamento and construct an enclosure around it. 
They were also hoping for resources to place a police booth at the entrance to the campamento 
(Interview,  SERVIU 2013).  This  would  allow the  authorities  to  prevent  a  repopulation  of  the 
16 http://www.techo.org/paises/chile/informate/secundarios-avanzan-en-trabajos-de-invierno-2013-en-chile/
17 http://www.techo.org/paises/chile/informate/1-200-universitarios-chilenos-construiran-viviendas-de-emergencia-
junto-a-familias-vulnerables-en-paraguay/
18 http://www.fundacionvivienda.cl/quienes-somos/historia/nuestro-fundador
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dwellings whose inhabitants were to move to social housing. In the SERVIU maps, the labyrinth of 
dwellings in the campamento was transformed into neat rows of  mediaguas, with a name of the 
inhabitant on each one. As the SERVIU director in charge put it: 
To close this place, we want people to understand that it's not good that I live next to someone I don't  
know. They need to change this, it needs to be an organized community. They need to get to know 
the neighbor living next to them, to apply [for the subsidy] together, to create a community, to have 
needs,  but  together, not individually, not to reproduce the hopelessness but to reproduce another 
thing: a more social sense of community. (Interview, SERVIU, 2013)
The campamento, in this view, is presented as the kind of anti-community described by Miller and 
Rose (2008),  and community-building as  a  remedy against  social  ills.  Paradoxically,  while  the 
authorities have blamed mediaguas for the growth of campamentos, they have also become a part of 
the solution in the process of closing them: they help in both physically organizing and controlling 
the campamento, and can provide a basis for further intervention: TECHO's “community insertion 
process” typically starts with the building of the mediaguas which are supposed to create the first 
links of trust between volunteers and the community. In the campamento I visited, the municipality 
had bought the mediaguas, and TECHO's role was to mobilize volunteers for constructing them.
Thus, the organization which started as a religious movement with the underlying rationality 
of charity and family values came to be involved with the governmental rationality to eradicate 
campamentos through housing programs. 
 
4.2 Programs to eradicate the campamentos and TECHO as an EGIS
Illegal settlements have been a constant problem for the Chilean governments. The accelerating 
rural-urban migration in the 1950s led to the formation of “poblaciones callampas”, self-constructed 
settlements in the available spaces of major cities. In the 1960s, the lack of housing for the urban 
poor  led into “tomas de terreno”, organized land occupations where the inhabitants intended to stay 
on the land they had occupied and pressured the state for a solution to their housing problem. In the  
1970,  they  intensified,  and  started  to  be  referred  to  as  campamentos,  reflecting  the  militancy, 
organized nature and self-management of collective needs in these urban spaces. (MINVU 2013: 
12-14). In the 1970s and 1980s, the military dictatorship instigated a massive eradication process, 
purging the  tomas from the wealthy Eastern municipalities (Vitacura,  Providencia,  Las Condes, 
Ñuñoa), and transferring their nearly 200.000 inhabitants to low-quality social housing in peripheral 
municipalities (Hidalgo 2004: 229). Tomas were no longer a viable option, and people opted to live 
as  allegados in  overcrowded  conditions  (MINVU  2013:  28).  In  1979,  the  land  market  was 
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liberalized, which has led to an explosive growth of the urban area and rising land prices which 
have further contributed to the residential segregation in Santiago (Hidalgo 2004: 226-229). After 
the return to democracy, the campamentos started growing, and by 1996, there were 712 of them in 
Chile (MINVU 2013). At this point, the subsidy system invented during the dictatorship had been 
consolidated (Gilbert 2002: 310), and a system of Technical Assistance was operating directly under 
the Ministry of Housing to help the housing committees of homeless to access the state subsidies.
In 1997,  the  Lagos government  had started a  multisectoral  program called Chile  Barrio 
(1997-2006) to deal with the problematic of campamentos. The aim was to 
Contribute,  through  integrated  action,  overcoming  poverty  in  the  precarious  settlements  of  the 
country, toward a substantial improvement of their housing situation, the quality of their habitat, and 
their opportunities of social and labour market insertion (MINVU 2013, my translation). 
TECHO had also become to realize that the mediaguas were not enough for people to leave poverty, 
and other programs related to education, entrepreneurship and health had started taking shape in the 
campamentos (Interviews, TECHO 2013). In 2006, the housing policy underwent a modification, 
and a new actor, the Entidades de Gestión Inmobiliaria Social, EGIS (Social Housing Management 
Entities)  were born. Their function in the housing policy was to “organize the demand” for the  
housing subsidies provided by the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda (Solidarity Housing Fund, FSV). In 
practice,  this  involved  creating  housing  committees  of  poor  families,  helping  them  with  the 
application process, looking for land to construct the housing, looking for a constructor, and the 
overall design of the housing project. This change created a new market acting with state support, as  
the state (SERVIU) pays the EGIS for their services:
It was the work of a function at SERVIU, who outsourced it, threw it out of their office […], they 
privatized it and coincidentally, it was also the ex-employees of SERVIU who formed the first EGIS. 
(Interview, Poblador organization 2013)
The  EGIS  could  be  private,  municipal,  or  not-for-profit  entities.  In  the  Bachelet  government's 
program, the Lineá de Atención de Campamentos (LAC, 2007-2010), the EGIS were consolidated, 
and  the  responsibility  for  the  eradication  of  campamentos  was  transferred  to  the  Ministry  of 
Housing (MINVU 2011, 2013).  TECHO transformed itself  into an EGIS in 2006,  and had,  by 
March 2013 provided 4500 social housing units (Interview, CEO TECHO, 2013). It has been one of 
the largest non-profit EGIS working with the poorest families.
The experiment with the EGIS should be seen in a context a conscious demobilization of 
popular  organizations  undertaken  by the  Concertación  governments.  After  democracy  returned, 
there had been a fear of organized land invasions (tomas) and the possible political conflicts they 
would create, if successful, with the army, and if evicted, with the communist party  (see e.g. Özler 
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2012).  Thus it became necessary for the political and economic elites to find ways to limit the 
power  of  “the  dangerous  classes”,  in  the  fear  that  they  would  “disrupt  stability  in  the  face  of 
sacrifices demanded by economic restructuring, particularly by making skittish international and 
domestic investors flee” (Chalmers et. al 1997, quoted online). The large committees of allegados 
were  de-structured  by  the  housing  policy,  limiting  the  size  of  the  families  in  each  housing 
committee  to  a  maximum of  200  families,  when  before  the  so  called  zone  coordinations  had 
consisted of thousands of organized families (Interview, NGO Activist 2013). 
The state therefore found itself in a situation in which it lacked a counterpart actor with 
which to negotiate in the field of housing, and the EGIS were intended to fill this gap (See Trincado 
2006). In addition, the EGIS were expected to address a broader set of problems than housing:
It emphasizes the need for accompaniment before, during and after the reception of the good, with 
the logic that housing is only one of the dimensions of the quality of life. It needs to be seen as a way 
of  “making oneself  responsible”  of  the  housing  problem in an integrated manner,  and from the 
perspective of the user. The housing becomes an opportunity of social and personal development for 
the improvement of other aspects affecting community life. (Surawski 2005a, quoted in Cannobbio 
et. al 2011: 42)
In other words, the aim was to produce social cohesion and to avoid social problems, “violence and 
other social pathologies” (Cannobbio et al 2011: 42). 
TECHO had many reasons to become an EGIS: it was already working in the campamentos 
through its Area de Intervención Social  (Area  of Social  Intervention),  it  wanted to  provide the 
families of the  campamentos a better solution than a  mediagua, and saw it as an opportunity to 
influence  public  policy  (Interview,  CEO and Director).  TECHO-Chile  currently  has  a  team of 
around 50 professionals (architects, lawyers, etc.) working on the housing projects, as paid staff, not 
as volunteers (Interview, Director, TECHO 2013). According to my interviews with TECHO, the 
for-profit  EGIS did  not  care  much about  the  location,  quality  or  services  around the  housing, 
thereby perpetuating the problems of social housing. They were also not very interested in working 
with  the  people  from  campamentos,  which  they  perceived  as  difficult  “customers”.  TECHO's 
housing projects, in contrast,  would accompany the families throughout the process:
We preoccupy ourselves with that the process of the housing application does not see housing as an 
end in itself but as a part of a social process, so that the families also understand that poverty does  
not end with housing, but that there are thousands of other issues that are important, the community 
organization,  that  they  are  part  of  the  process  of  selecting  their  housing.  (Interview,  Director,  
TECHO 2013)
Most of the TECHO directors I interviewed also recognized the problems of the previous housing 
policies, such as the small size of the apartments, the lack of infrastructure and green areas and the 
socioeconomic  segregation  of  the  neighborhoods.  But  they  insisted  that  TECHO  had  made  a 
contribution to public policy.
20
In  that  time  there  were  130.000  families,  today  there  are  close  to  30.000  families  living  in 
campamentos. From this point of view, we were able to drive an excellent public policy. And from 
the qualitative point of view, also the standards of the emergency houses improved. Today there are 
standards of localization where the policy demands that a social housing community, a condominium 
of social housing, is around green areas, community meeting spaces, and also the requirements of the 
minimum sizes of the housing have improved. So from this point of view, even if there remains a lot 
to do because the minimum sizes allowed are 40 to 42 m2, which is still very little for the average  
family, but without a doubt, they have improved immensely compared to what it was before. So from 
this point of view we can say that there's a mission completed, as from now on the families in the  
campamentos receive housing solutions that are trampolines for overcoming poverty, not poverty 
traps as they used to be. (Interview, CEO TECHO 2013)
An evaluation report by SUR profesiónales, however, (Cannobbio et. al 2011) reveals that the EGIS 
did not deliver the expected outcomes in the housing policy. The satisfaction of beneficiaries with 
the non-profit EGIS was only 46%, lower than that with the public or the private for-profit EGIS 
(ibid: 111-112). Moreover, the community leaders were in actual fact doing many tasks that the 
EGIS were supposed to be doing, such as organizing the demand and administrative tasks (ibid: 
116). Despite the stated policy aims to reduce segregation, 57% of the social housing being built 
were still located in socially homogenous communities (ibid: 130), and the model was found to 
impede projects of urban integration (ibid: 101). This did not, however, result in recommendations 
to do away with the model, only to further adjust it.
According to my interview with the MINVU official, while they valued TECHO as one of 
the few EGIS that wanted to work with the  campamentos, they also acknowledged that there had 
been problems:
in certain projects we [the state, through SERVIU] have had to assume as EGIS because it's difficult  
to get them along to a happy end, you know. This regardless of their [TECHO's] role that I insist has 
been  important.  However,  within  the  closure  of  the  settlements,  in  that  part  of  the  story,  this 
government, especially this government, is the one that has put on the table that we want to close the  
settlements and that we don't want to go any more to the settlements giving the subsidies to the half  
of them, and leaving the other one in order that it becomes again repopulated, because that is what  
happened during the government before. (Interview, MINVU 2013)
I  understood  this  after  visiting  a  campamento in  the  Metropolitan  Region,  where  the  housing 
committee with TECHO as an EGIS only included about a half of the  campamento's population. 
SERVIU had taken over the overall responsibility of the closure process, with the aim of improving 
the living conditions there by improving roads, installing lightning, creating a football field. With 
the latest modification of the housing policy, SERVIU had returned to its role as an EGIS and was  
running another housing committee as well running coordination meetings with the two committees 
and the municipality (Interview, SERVIU 2013). 
The EGIS could be seen as an example of how a policy with the governmental rationality of 
“the free market” has required the state to intervene deeper into the non-economic sphere, devising 
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diverse ways of making the “demand” (the poor in the  campamentos) respond to the incentives 
offered by the policy (applying for subsidies), and aiming to correct the flaws in previous programs 
by creating new ones. No actor in this context seems to have had an interest in questioning the basis 
of the subsidy model.
As Miller and Rose (2008: 35) have noted, government is a constantly failing activity and 
the programs often produce unexpected effects or are appropriated by people to their own ends. 
Tired with both the EGIS and the constructors profiting on them, and with doing, in practice, most 
of the work that the EGIS should have been doing (organizing the demand, doing the paperwork, 
looking for land),  some community leaders decided to  create  their  own EGIS (EaGIS, Entidad 
AutoGestion Inmobiliaria Social) (Castillo 2011, Interviews, poblador movement 2013). Due to the 
scarcity of land, you could only construct small projects in good locations, and private constructors 
were  not  interested  in  this  as  it  was  not  profitable  enough,  so  they  also  created  their  own 
constructor. 
Obviously, we are against the market, we are not interested in profit, we are interested in people 
having housing, but we also play by the rules of the game to drive a project.
If the state can't and the private constructors don't want to, we the organized pobladores can and want 
to manage our own housing projects. (Interview, poblador movement 2013).
Operating largely on voluntary forces and using the subsidies and the money SERVIU pays the 
EGIS, they were able to construct small, well-located projects with apartments that were larger than 
the standard social housing and whose value would rise over time. One could have expected the 
government to welcome such a self-management initiative but that was not the case, as will  be 
discussed below.
4.4 A strategic alliance with civil society?
The LAC program, like its predecessors, did not manage to end with the  campamentos: in fact 
during the program, the number of  campamentos increased from 490 to 657, and in 2011, there 
were 83 863 people living in them (MINVU 2013). In 2010, when the current government took 
charge,  the housing policy underwent a further change: The housing fund, “Fondo Solidario de 
Vivienda” (FSV) changed its name into “Fondo Solidario de  Elección de Vivienda (FSEV)”, and 
the EGIS are now called “Entidades Patrocinantes” (Supporting Organizations, EP). Committees 
and individuals are now also allowed to apply without a project, by selecting their apartment in a 
SERVIU registry  of  available  housing  constructed  by  the  private  market  (Interviews  SERVIU, 
MINVU 2012). In the preparation of the new Decree 49, the poblador movements lobbied for a land  
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bank, and a decree that would recognize self-management in the housing policy, but in the end, both 
initiatives failed (Castillo 2011). Instead, the government changed the rules for the new Entidades 
Patrocinantes,  requiring them to have contracted staff and more financial  guarantees,  making it 
impossible for the EaGIS to function. 
They started to get scared […] because in reality they didn't understand what we were referring to 
when we talked about self-management, that in reality we could be administering fiscal resources.  
(Interview, poblador movement 2013)
A new department, “The Executive Secretary of Aldeas and Campamentos” took charge of 
erradicating the  campamentos.  It  created an “Integrated Plan for the Campamentos 2012-2013” 
(MINVU  2011)  which  represents  an  important  change  in  that  SERVIU  is  given  overall 
responsibility  of  the  closure  of  campamentos.  It  has  also  meant  the  doubling  the  number  of 
subsidies available  for the families in  campamentos,  to 18 000. The subsidy itself,  is  the most 
important contribution that the government in Chile makes for poverty reduction: it's a “24 000 
dollar asset, you know, for life, it's  giving them private property, it's  the largest subsidy that is 
given”. (Interview, MINVU 2013).
An interesting aspect of the plan is the  “Strategic Alliance with Civil Society” it entails, 
with the only organizations mentioned being TECHO and the “Corporación de Dirigentas También 
somos Chilenos”, an organization of community leaders that was, like TECHO, founded with the 
help of Felipe Berrios19 and has its seat inside the TECHO office space in Santiago. The latter 
organization,  whose  leaders recently received training in  Washington,  paid by the  IDB20,  has a 
conservative discourse in the context of social mobilization in Chile:
The biggest achievement is having created this Corporation. There has never existed a grassroots 
social movement in Chile that has done much more than fought with the cops on the street. (Cecilia  
Castro, quoted in www.dirigentes.cl, my translation)
TECHO and  the  Corporación  de  Dirigentes  También  somos  Chilenos  seem to  be  the  kind  of 
responsible  actors that  “fit  into  and correspond to the more  general  rationality of government” 
(Sending and Neumann 2006: 667), while, for example, the poblador organizations do not. As Leiva 
(2008: 168) has noted, the state in Chile has been allying itself with only such actors in civil society 
that, though making demands from the state, do not question the underlying structures of power.
There also seems to be considerable agreement between the government and TECHO on the 
aims of   policy:  in  the  foreword to  the  Strategy,  president  Piñera  affirms the  intentions of  his 
government of eradicating the  campamentos, and TECHO also makes use of the campamento in 
their  campaigns.  A recent  example  is  a  running  event  for  the  benefit  of  TECHO with  Banco 
19 http://www.dirigentes.cl/
20 http://blog.latercera.com/blog/ccastro/entry/beca_a_washington_para_mujeres
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Santander, with the slogan “For a Chile without campamentos”21. The joint aims become apparent 
also on the level of language. Consider, for example, the wording of the Integrated Plan and the 
CEO's analysis of the problem:
A Multidimensional Strategy. The Integrated Plan for the Campamentos assumes that the housing 
shortage is a symptom of a very complex reality, and the solution for leaving poverty can not be  
based on a housing solution alone. (MINVU 2011b)
Indeed,  the  problematic  of  housing  should  not  be  confronted  solely  by  housing,  it  needs  to  be 
confronted from a multi-dimensional perspective, and this is what TECHO does, and we are also  
promoting that the government should also do it this way. (Interview, CEO TECHO 2013)
Such common formulations, where actors share the conceptions and can translate the other's terms 
to their own, enable a network of “government at a distance” (Miller and Rose 2008).  But what has 
TECHO's actual role in closing the campamentos been? Although acknowledging TECHO's efforts, 
Ministry of Housing firmly establishes government control over the process:
What  they  do  is  that  they  work  as  an  EGIS  and  they  finish  the  projects  of  housing,  and  the 
government pays them for that. The closing of the settlements is something that we as a government 
have assumed and which we have been charged for and responsible. TECHO has not participated in 
that end...I don't know if it's convenient for them. (Interview, MINVU 2013)
The MINVU official stated that I was the government, not TECHO that had the policy initiative and 
resources  for  closing  the  campamentos.  This  confirms  Sending  and  Neumann's  (2006:  652) 
observation that transferring some state functions to non-state actors does not reduce state power 
(see also Miller and Rose 2008: 81). On the contrary, civil society actors such as NGOs can bring 
legitimacy to efforts to govern (Sending and Neumann 2006: 652).
4.5 “Social Inclusion”: Producing responsible citizens in self-managing communities
“Social  Inclusion”  (“Habilitación  Social”)  became  a  permanent  requirement  in  the  housing 
programs in 2006, involving a plan of Habilitación Social to be created by the EGIS together with 
the community (MINVU 2008). “Social Inclusion” is key to TECHO¨'s community intervention: it  
has an own department and director in both the Chile office and the Headquarters, and has recently 
started promoting the methodology in other countries as well. One TECHO Director defined the 
concept as follows:
we are talking about empowering people, the development of social skills, development of political 
skills, and the development of more individual capacities that allow them to insert themselves into 
society. (Interview, Director, TECHO 2013)
I initially took the “Social Inclusion” to be a creation of TECHO, and only later discovered that it is 
21 http://www.redrunning.cl/santander_techo/
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a mandatory component in the housing programs. The MINVU functionary, however, confirmed 
that it was originally a methodology created by the government:
No, it was a job that was supposedly done by the ministry but which the TECHO started developing  
further, probably, and putting on the agenda the importance of this group of families that sometimes, 
no, they're the more difficult ones to work with. And they put on the agenda in a certain way that 
these families  had an urgency and they  started working first  on the social  side of  the demand. 
(Interview, MINVU 2013)
“Social Inclusion”, for TECHO, involves three kinds of programs: education, work, and community 
development. It's “Strategia de Habilitación Social 2013-2015” states community development as 
one of its chief objectives:
We seek to incentivize that the communities generate their own identity that characterizes them and 
differentiates  them  from  other  communities,  promoting  spaces  of  community  participation that 
allows them to identify their problems and organize themselves to look for better solutions. All these 
efforts should be realized through articulation with formal networks that allows them to access more 
and  better  opportunities,  through  consolidating  community  self-management in  the  process  of 
overcoming poverty. (TECHO 2013, my translation, original emphasis)
This  concept  of  community  organizing  involves  all  the  components  of  empowerment: 
consciousness,  knowledge  and action  (See  Cruikshank 2002:  70).  However,  the  strategy offers 
menu of pre-defined programs from education and training courses to microcredits to community 
projects for which funding may be applied following strict criteria and rules (TECHO 2013). These 
are detailed in predetermined phases, from a “participatory community diagnostic” (also mandatory 
for the housing subsidy application) to the implementation, coordination and quantitative evaluation 
mechanisms. Moreover, all these processes are to be coordinated by the TECHO volunteers (ibid). 
As  Cruikshank  (2002:82)  has  noted,  “Establishing  a  relationship  of  governance  requires  first 
reconstituting  the  poor  and the  powerless  as  acting  subjects.  In  short,  according to  a  logic  of 
empowerment, the poor must be made to act”.
This  is  not  to  say  that  such  programs would  not  improve  the  lives  of  the  individuals, 
families,  and  communities  they  are  targeting.  But  it  is  clear  that  such  participation  is  already 
circumscribed in its scope to the micro-level, to the community, neighborhood and municipality. 
Several of the people I interviewed commented on the limited scope of participation, generally in 
Chile,  oriented towards “the result,  the  product,  housing as a product,  or  the  product  of urban 
improvement,  of  a  square,  a  street,  a  green area”  (Interview,  NGO Activist  2013). It  could be 
described as participation with a “restricted horizon”:
The problem that had to be coordinated was how to produce high future expectations with a high 
tolerance  for  a  non-modifiable  present.  This  is  the  equation  that  had  to  be  sought.  So  firstly, 
importantly,  the  destruction  of  the  utopian  horizon,  because  if  you  have  a  utopian  horizon, 
necessarily, if you say you want something in the future, you will also advance on this road, and the 
present will change. So the most important thing was to abolish the utopian horizon and to keep 
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simply on medium term achievements that are easy to define, either you have them or not. So they 
tell you, “well, what is the point you want to reach?” “What I want to have is a life”, but it results in  
“you have these possibilities, take these possibilities”. They tell you, focus on the object you want 
and  not  so  much  on  the  process.  Which  is  pro-authoritarian  thinking...(Interview,  researcher,  
Universidad de Chile 2013)
The residents of the campamentos are expected to bear with their circumstances, and the long wait 
for the concrete goal of a house, while participating in various community activities which they can 
influence but which ultimately are coordinated from above. Housing becomes something you have 
to  be  worthy  of  by  improving yourself,  managing  your  savings,  as  one  member  of  a  housing 
committee expressed it:
It's like TECHO helps you in our home, helps you with the kids, helps you to be a better person, to 
be an entrepreneur, to train yourself  better,  it's a good organization. It's like your second home. 
TECHO built this community space three years ago and it's a great help for the kids to go to the class  
room, to the library. Also in addition to helping you they like it when people are learning. Here in the 
campamento there were no water towers, they got people together and you pay a certain amount and 
they install it for you and you're better off, they give you the key and you get water, all these benefits 
they are bringing but there are also other organizations that are helping. (member  of  TECHO 
housing committee, my translation, my emphasis)
I got to know her during my day at the constructions, and she probably associated me with TECHO, 
so I do not know if she was only telling me what she wanted me to hear. But the idea of community  
empowerment  linked  to  self-empowerment  had  clearly  taken  root  through  working  in  the 
committee.  Such  forms  of  “empowerment”,  however,  are  in  themselves  an  exercize  of  power 
(Cruikshank  2002:  70,  Cornwall  2002:  33).  Moreover,  the  concepts  of  community,  or  of 
empowerment, in these programs are not self-evident. I realized after talking to the SERVIU and 
Municipal directors and the members of the two housing committees in the campamento, that rather 
than the campamento, the unit to be empowered was the committee, the group of individuals that 
would live in a social housing complex together in the future, to avoid the social problems both 
TECHO and the authorities mentioned:
What happens is, I have in the municipality of XX, 3000 families living there in less than a year.  
What this does to the municipality, it kills it. Three thousand people from other parts, because the  
land is cheaper to consruct social housing, they arrive there. What does it do to the municipality? It  
destroys it socially. […] There are no services and the vulnerability of the families is super low. You 
haven't finshed school, you go to smoke crack outside, and the children and the families that live 
there,  they  reproduce  the  same  expectations.[...]  We  as  a  country  have  a  serious  problem with 
education, here the education is not provided by the state, in my personal opinion. Here the education 
is a privilege, more than a house, or, it's more easy to get a house than to get an education. I don't  
know which should come first, I don't know. (Interview, SERVIU 2013)
The governmental rationality behind “Social  Inclusion” seems to be correcting the problems of 
socioeconomically  segregated neighborhoods, not by changing the housing policy that produces 
such  neighborhoods  (see  Rodriguez  and  Sugranyes  2012a,  2012b),  but  by  changing  the  poor 
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individuals,  responsibilizing  them  as  “members  of  community”.  These  kinds  of  programs 
conciously operate on the socioemotional and personal-psychological level, with the aim of forging 
“an emotional lnk between the community and state agent deployed in the new micro-spatial scales 
of state intervention” producing a sense of belonging in a polarized society on a symbolic level 
(Leiva  2008:  168-169).  By  adopting  and  developing  the  methodology  of  “Social  Inclusion”, 
TECHO also seems to have aligned itself with this governmental rationality.
4.5 Networks of influence
I had a chance to witness an event for handing out of mattresses and bedclothes for families with  
children at a campamento in the Metropolitan Region, at the social space TECHO had built a few 
years ago. Present were members of the two housing committees, representatives of a foundation 
that  had  organized  the  mattresses,  the  Executive  Secretary  of  Aldeas  and  Campamentos, 
representatives of SERVIU, and a TV channel.  There was music,  lemonade and cookies for the 
children. A truck (Homecenter Sodimac, also a sponsor of TECHO) arrived with the mattresses. 
Speeches were held, the director of the foundation was talking about the importance of making 
good choices. There was a tall blond man I had seen somewhere before.
The man turned out to  be Felipe Kast,  the former  Presidential  Delegate  for Aldeas and 
Campamentos,  former  Minister  of  Planning  (MIDEPLAN)  and  son  of  Miguel  Kast,  Planning 
Minister  During  the  Pinochet  Dictatorship  who has  been credited  as  the  father  of  the  Chilean 
housing model (See Gilbert 2002: 313, Hidalgo 2004). Kast is also one of the youths that founded 
TECHO22 together with Berrios and Francisco Irrarazaval, the current Subsecretary of Housing at 
MINVU23. Kast has, on several occasions, stepped in to defend TECHO against criticism related to 
delays in housing projects24 and other irregularities25. He left his office at MINVU in December 
2012 to found his own right-wing party, Evolución Politica, and is now running a parliamentary 
campaign in Santiago26.
Many TECHO employees later move on to the state administration, particularly SERVIU, 
where,  according to  my interview with  a  former TECHO employee  now working in  SERVIU, 
TECHO has a lot of influence. This is because
22http://www.quepasa.cl/articulo/19_2124_9.html  
23http://www.gob.cl/subsecretarios/vivienda/  
24 http://www.lasegunda.com/Noticias/Nacional/2012/06/757289/kast-el-techo-hace-una-labor-extraordinaria
25 http://www.13.cl/t13/entrevistas/felipe-kast-aclara-polemica-del-gobierno-y-un-techo-para-chile
26 http://www.evopoli.cl/2013/blog/felipe-kast-entrega-con-la-fundacion-ilumina-la-ultima-de-las-dos-mil-camas-
repartidas-a-ninos-de-campamentos/
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A person that has experience in the technicality of a public policy, it's typical to look for the people 
in the NGOs and I believe un TECHO para Chile has this role. They have experience in this. And 
also I believe they have the social capital to do this. They have the social networks to do this. They 
know the right people to do this. […] They have distinct social networks. (Interview, SERVIU 2013)
In the interviews, TECHO does admit that,  though it  is  not  affiliated to  any political  party,  its 
connections allow it to influence in public policy:
In our country,  TECHO has and has achieved for the rigor of its  work during all  these years a  
position as an important actor in society which gives us credibility and permits us to raise many  
demands and make the decision-makers see us as we are molesting them until things happen, and we 
take advantage of this, and also of being a youth organization that can easily go to the minister and 
say: “you know what, we don't like this at all”. (Interview, Director TECHO 2013)
I started looking into these networks of influence in secondary sources, as TECHO does not publish 
information  on its  founders  and board  members.  The following figure,  based  on various news 
articles  (for  a  list,  see  Appendix  1),  presents  TECHO  in  the  kind  of  loose  network  of 
constitutionally  distinct actors that allows actors to construct common aims and perceptions (cf 
Miller  and  Rose  2008).  The  arrows  represent  direct  relationships.  The  figure  is  necessarily 
incomplete, and not all relations are direct but may be through joint projects or funds. However, it  
illustrates  the  deceptiveness  of  seeing  TECHO as  a  part  of  some kind  of  an  autonomous  and 
apolitical civil society. Rather, it resembles the concept of “elite circulation” introduced by Tvedt 
(2006a: 687-688), in which personnel and leaders from NGOs frequently move between positions 
of government and research institutions, and are thus almost simultaneously “on all sides of the 
table”. This practice enables the indirect use of power but is difficult to question, as 
participants and outsiders regard the protagonists as participants in a good, morally commendable 
project,  and  therefore  other  rules  should  apply  and one  should  be  prepared  to  accept  continual 
breaches of various types of rules regarding conflicts of interest. (ibid: 688)
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Figure 1. TECHO in a network of actors
The  members  of  the  poblador  movement  were  sharply  critical  of  how  this  system  works, 
interpreting it as a mode of control:
Techo para Chile is a school of government for the rich. It is a school of government where the rich  
are trained to govern the poor. Today you can see they are in ruin because they are all working for 
the government. Everyone working today at the Ministry of Housing, in SERVIU, are all ex-TECHO 
para Chile. Whether the Concertación or the right were winning [in the 2010 presidential elections],  
TECHO para Chile had the priest Berrios as a leader and founder, and they could be in either one of 
the governments because Bowen and Kast were in the different campaigns, and TECHO would win 
anyway. (Interviews, poblador movement 2013)
In their perception, it is easier for NGOs to arrive with presents to the campamentos or poblaciónes, 
(as I witnessed in case of the mattresses) to learn about the people, and the ways in which they are 
trying to cheat the system, especially the Ficha de Protección Social which determines eligibility to 
the housing subsidy as well as other subsidies. The NGO employees then move on to government 
and basically  use this  knowledge to  change the  rules in  a  way that  was against  their  interests 
(Interviews, poblador movement 2013). In considering the different treatment of the EaGIS of the 
poblador organizations and TECHO as EGIS by the government, the politics behind this becomes 
obvious. But perhaps rather than constituting this as a simple left – right division, it could be the 
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division between the anti-establishment  and the establishment.  TECHO clearly takes a cautious 
stance toward social mobilization, stating that “It's not our fight”, or, as one director explained:
But I believe here we need be careful because: one, the social demands of our country today are 
demands 2.0, that speak of a country a little more developed, and that are demands that mainly seek 
to benefit the middle class, something that I find incredible, but there are also things that we should 
not forget. For example, the demands of the students for a free education of quality, they don't speak 
for the youth or the children that are today in the campamentos and that don't think about entering 
higher education, because the problem of these families is still primary education, so I think today in 
our country we are a little bit trapped, or we a running a risk of joining these demands of a country 
that  is  advancing in development and forgetting the demands that  are  directly  and unacceptably 
affecting the poorest families. (Interview, Director, TECHO 2013)
The  discourse  is  similar  to  that  of  the  government:  in  a  recent  interview,  the  subsecretary  of 
education said “We need to be careful not to let totalitarian visions to impose a single agenda”, that 
Chile has advanced but that the limited resources should be invested in “those that need them the 
most”, i.e. the poor.27 TECHO have been the experts of poverty in Chile for years, are doing their 
own research on the issues, and thus can speak with a voice of authority about poverty. However, 
one of the inhabitants of the campamento gave me a completely different view on education:
I couldn't go to the university because my mum couldn't afford it, we were six siblings and imagine 
that here you have to pay 300 [USD 600] a month and the minimum salary is 200 000[USD 400] and 
how do you eat? How do you feed your kids? There's no way! […] I think education should be free 
so that people's salaries would rise, see? The others are sitting and earning millions and people that 
are breaking their backs every day get 200 000, it's like not logical, they are driving around Chile in 
their cars and the people here only have seen what's between here and their workplaces and no more, 
the salaries need to rise so you can pay and save at least, if the dudes [students] are marching I  
support them if they want to study. (Interview, Housing committee member 2013)
The minimum salary in Chile recently rose to 210.000 pesos (about USD 400). Moreover, according 
to the OECD country report (2012: 47-48), Chile has one of the lowest intergenerational income 
mobilities  within  the  OECD,  and  access  to  higher  education  is  a  factor  in  this.  Considering 
TECHO's  role  in  governmentality  discussed  above,  it  is  perhaps  natural  that  they  do  not 
wholeheartedly support the social mobilization.
5. Conclusions: TECHO and housing as a solution to poverty
This  qualitative  case  study  was  aimed  at  examining  the  Chilean  NGO  TECHO  as  a  part  of 
governmentality, the way in which power is excersized through a loose network of state and non-
state actors in the programs for closing the  campamentos, which have persisted in Chile despite 
27 http://www.latercera.com/noticia/educacion/2013/08/657-537246-9-subsecretario-rojas-estudiantes-protestan-
porque-chile-avanza.shtml
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sustained economic growth. It has sought to answer the question of how TECHO's role has evolved 
in relation to these programs. It first traced TECHO's development from a religiously motivated 
youth movement building mediaguas in the 1990s to its involvement as an EGIS in the mid 00's, a 
government  supplier  seeking to  enroll  the  people in  campamentos  to  social  housing programs. 
Compared to  autonomous social  organizations  and their  treatment,  we saw that  TECHO has  a 
special position in governmentality. It then went on to discuss the concept of “Social Inclusion” as a 
technology of producing social cohesion responsible citizens that would access housing through a 
regulated  self-management  of  their  communities  and  of  themselves.  It  suggests  that  TECHO's 
special  position  has  been  established  and  consolidated  through  a  kind  of  circulation  between 
government positions and the organization. This has created a system of mutual understandings and 
influence that do not challenge the basis of the housing policy, which generates income for the 
EGIS and profit for the constructors and land owners. 
The Chilean housing policy is often viewed as a model in Latin America for its achievement  
in reducing the housing deficit. Yet the social housing constructed under this policy has been of 
poor quality and profit logic of the model has created marginalized neigbourhoods far from the 
opportunities of the city. This has consolidated the sharp social divisions which characterize the 
Chilean society, and the fear which builds many fences prevents the creation of socioeconomically 
mixed neighbourhoods. There are also perverse incentives for the poor to try to compete in poverty 
to access the housing benefit,  either by trying to cheat on the Ficha de Protección Social or by  
moving  to  the  campamento to  jump  the  housing  queue.  However,  for  many  people  of  the 
campamentos, the only thing that changes is that they have a solid roof, electricity and water bills  
they cannot pay, and that they have lost many social benefits as they are now homeowners, seen as 
the new middle class of the Chilean poverty reduction “success story”. But a house or an apartment 
does not give them education, decent salaries, or health, things that the Chileans pay dearly for but 
that in other many other OECD countries are provided as a matter of right so that you can later,  
perhaps, buy a house. As can be observed since the social mobilization started in Chile in 2010, 
neither housing, nor the associated community-building activities can guarantee social cohesion in a 
system that the majority perceives as unjust. Charity indeed begins where justice ends.
I would suggest further studies on TECHO in other countries in Latin America, as well as its 
connections to business, especially in the context of the mining industry with which it has had many 
partnerships in the North of Chile.
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APENDIX 1
News resources on the affiliations of TECHO
José Manuel Edwards Silva, Renovación Nacional
Cofounder of TECHO, in IDB 2006-2009: 
http://legislativo.votainteligente.cl/Parlamentario/show/id_parlamentario/140
http://www.camara.cl/camara/diputado_detalle.aspx?prmid=935
Francisco Irrarazaval, Subsecretary of Housing, MINVU
Co-founder of TECHO
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2012/11/12/569229/francisco-irarrazaval-es-el-nuevo-
subsecretario-de-vivienda-y-urbanismo.html
http://www.gob.cl/subsecretarios/vivienda/
Felipe Kast, Candidate, Evolución Politica, ex-presidencial delegate of Aldeas and Campamentos
Cofounder of TECHO
http://www.quepasa.cl/articulo/19_2124_9.html
http://www.latercera.com/contenido/674_224840_9.shtml
http://diario.latercera.com/2011/08/11/01/contenido/pais/31-79711-9-kast-anuncia-18-mil-
subsidios-para-familias-de-campamentos.shtml
http://www.capital.cl/negocios/laboratorio-contra-la-pobreza/ (affiliaton with J-PAL)
Felipe Berrios
Founder of TECHO, Founder of Corporación de Dirigentas También Somos Chilenos
http://www.dirigentes.cl/
Javier Zulueta
http://www.porunchilesinpobreza.cl/index.php?
option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=2&Itemid=6
http://gestionsocial.cl/equipo/
Anita Holuguie
http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id=%7B346175e5-b24b-41b9-89f5-
e33471df7b48%7D
Jesuit institutions
http://www.quepasa.cl/articulo/actualidad/2012/04/1-8159-9-la-renovacion-de-los-jesuitas.shtml
Business
TECHO sponsors
http://www.techo.org/chile/

